Introduction
In his highly influential book Making Things Happen, James Woodward argues for an interventionist theory of causation. In the recent debate, the interventionist theory has been enthusiastically received as an adequate theory of causation in the special sciences. Especially, the interventionist theory has been taken to apply to the social and the biomedical sciences (for instance and apart from Woodward' A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct cause of Y with respect to some variable set V is that there be a possible intervention on X that will change Y (or the probability distribution of Y) when all other variables are held fixed at some value by interventions. (Woodward 2003: 55) The central character of interventions in Woodward's framework is obvious:
Woodward's definitions of various causal notions imply that the truth of a causal statement "X directly causes Y" requires the existence of a possible intervention on X. Another way to make the same point is that if "X directly causes Y" is true, then the following interventionist counterfactuals have to be true: "if there were an intervention I = i on X such that X = x, then Y = y would be the case", and "if there were an intervention I = i* on X such that X = x*, then Y = y* would be the case" (with i≠i*, x≠x*, y≠y*). Woodward requires that interventions be merely in principle possible. Woodward interprets in principle possibility as logical possibility. Call this the modal character of interventions.
Let me add two clarifications at this point. First, what kind of a project is Woodward's interventionist theory of causation? It is crucial to emphasize that Woodward is not concerned with the methodology of causation, i.e. the construction of algorithms that allow to infer causal models from statistical data (cf. Woodward 2003: 38) . 1 The aim of interventionists is to provide a semantic account of causal statements. Woodward is very explicit about the semantic goal of his approach: "my aim is to give an account of the content or meaning of various locutions, such as X causes Y […]" (Woodward 2003 (Woodward : 38, my emphasis, cf. also 2003 (Woodward : 7-9, 2008 . However, despite the prima facie virtues 4 of interventionist theories of causation, I will argue that the key notion of the interventionist approach -the notion of a possible intervention -turns out to be deeply problematic. In particular, I will argue that Woodward's notion of an intervention is problematic 3 However, Woodward's worlds should be understood as model worlds or small worlds, i.e. assignments of values to variables in a causal model (cf. Pearl 2000: 207) . In this respect, Woodwardian worlds differ from Lewisian worlds because the latter are as typically as detailed as the real spatio-temporal entity we inhabit (cf. Hüttemann 2004: 113) . 4 Interventionist theories are considered to be successful because (a) they explicate several kinds of causation that are referred to in the sciences (e.g. actual causes, type-level causes, indeterministic causes etc.), (b) they account for several typical features of causation (e.g. the time-asymmetry of causation), and (c) they provide a successful description of intuitively possible causal scenarios (such as preemption scenarios), because of the modal character of possible interventions. I will argue for two claims The general form of Woodward's counterexample is:
X is a cause of Y but there is no physically possible intervention I = i on X.
I will distinguish two senses of "spontaneously" in the quote by Woodward. Two concrete examples from physics illustrate these cases:
"only spontaneously" in the sense that there is no deterministic, physically possible way to manipulate Uranium such that it surely decays at a time t.
Nonetheless, the decay of Uranium causes a flash on a screen (as a measurement in an experimental setup). Yet, one can raise the probability that the Uranium atom decays (e.g. by increasing the energy of the nucleus of the Uranium atom). In other words, there is a physically possible indeterministic intervention on Uranium decay. Norton's Dome. John Norton (2007: 22-28) argues for a case of uncaused events that is compatible with Newtonian mechanics. Norton imagines a symmetrically shaped dome that is located in downward directed gravitational 6 Woodward (2003: 208f) discusses the constant speed of light, and observes that the generalization "All physical processes propagate at a speed less than or equal to that of light" is not invariant under physically possible interventions. 7 Of course, one can disagree with the assumption in the antecedent that physical constants are indeed causes. However, let us assume that they are causes at least for the sake of the argument. 
Norton claims that the following scenario is consistent with Newtonian mechanics:
It is a mass at rest in a physical environment that is completely unchanging for an arbitrary amount of time -a day, a month, an eon. Then without any external intervention or any change in the physical environment, the mass spontaneously moves off in an arbitrary direction with the theory supplying no probabilities for the time or direction of the motion. (Norton 2007: 22f.) Norton interprets the acceleration of the mass as an uncaused event (cf. Norton 2007: 24). I will use Norton's dome scenario in the following way: suppose that the acceleration of the mass has an effect e (for instance, the mass hits a little bell that is located at the base of the dome). 9 Further suppose that we posit very restricted worlds such that the worlds only contain the mass, the dome, the gravitational field, and the effect e. In these restricted dome-worlds, there exists no physically possible event that may play the role of an intervention on the mass, because all that exists in the restricted dome-worlds is the mass, the dome, the gravitational field, and the effect e. In other words, restricted dome-worlds conform to Norton's initial description of the dome-scenario -the idea that the "physical environment that is completely unchanging for an arbitrary amount of time" -in an extreme way by isolating the dome. Hence, in these restricted domeworlds it is the case that (a) the uncaused acceleration of the mass itself is a cause of event e, and (b) a physically possible intervention does not exist. What do these counterexamples show? One might be inclined to object:
"isn't the Big Bang case a rather far-fetched counterexample from physics?".
However, even if these counterexamples are far-fetched ones from physics, they 10 I'd like to thank Carl Craver and John Norton for very helpful discussions of the dome-scenario. 11 Thanks to Michael Baumgartner for pointing this out.
should raise the following suspicion: in general and apart from these specific cases of the counterexamples, the possibility to intervene on the cause X seems to be completely irrelevant for the truth conditions of "X causes Y". Apart from this worry concerning the specific choice of counterexamples from physics, I think that the force of my arguments (that I will present in SECTION 4) does not necessarily depend on the existence of actual cases of the general form of the counterexample. All of my worries should still be justified even if it turned out that, as Woodward acknowledges, it is merely a "logically coherent possibility" (Woodward 2003: 130) that X is a cause of Y but there is no physically possible intervention I = i on X -even if there are no actual (physical) cases of this kind.
Woodward rejects these kinds of counterexamples by pointing out that interventions need not even be physically possible. Woodward (2003: 128f) understands the relevant sense physical possibility as follows:
An intervention I = i is physically possible iff I = i is consistent with some set of possible initial conditions and the actual laws.
12 Woodward (2003: 128f) claims that the counterexamples show that an intervention on X is not be required to be physically possible. Instead of being physically possible, interventions are required to be possible in the sense that they are merely "logically possible" or not "ill-defined for conceptual or metaphysical reasons" (Woodward 2003: 128, 132) . Note that, although Woodward introduces a distinction of logical, conceptual, and metaphysical possibility, he refers only to logical possibility in the large majority of cases and, further, he seems to use these kinds of modality interchangeably. For this reason, I will not explore the potential differences between these kinds of modality in this paper.
Is Woodward's strategy to deal with the counterexamples by weakening the required notion of possibility really convincing? I think it is not. In the next 12 Woodward also considers another stronger reading of physical possibility: an intervention I = i is strongly physically possible iff I = i is consistent with actual initial conditions and the actual laws. However, Woodward -correctly, I think -dismisses strong physical possibility as a too demanding requirement for the interventionist theory of causation (cf. Woodward 2003: 128). section, I will present two arguments against Woodward's strategy to deal with the counterexamples.
Two Arguments against the Need for Logically Possible Interventions
In this section, I will present two arguments against Woodward's abovementioned strategy. The first argument aims to establish that interventions are dispensable for Woodward's semantic project as long as one allows for them to be merely logically possible. The second argument supports the claim that interventions with this modal character lead to the fatal result that interventionist counterfactuals are evaluated inadequately.
First Argument
The first argument addresses the claim that merely logically possible interventions can be dispensed with -which would be lead to a collapse of the interventionist theory as it stands. When I claim that merely logically possible interventions are dispensable I mean by this that interventions with this modal character fail to contribute non-trivially to the truth conditions of causal claims, i.e. interventions can be eliminated without loss. The conclusion of the first arguments is that interventions are dispensable for stating the truth conditions of causal claims such as "X is a direct type-level cause of Y". In other words, the first argument is a dispensability argument. I use the notion of dispensability in analogy to its use in indispensability arguments in philosophy of mathematics (cf. Putnam 1975 , Field 1980 ): a term in a theory (in our case, the notion of an intervention) is dispensable if this term can be eliminated without compromising the strength of the theory (that is, the adequacy of an explication of causation). • The variable God ranges over the set of possible values {forgiving; jealous}.
13 Maudlin (2002: 150) describes the following scenario as "at least metaphysically possible". I think that for this reason Maudlin's example qualifies for my current purpose. 14 One might object that "there is a cause of the Big Bang" is conceptually impossible, because, by definition, the Big Bang cannot have a physical cause. Since God need not be a physical being Maudlin's example nicely avoids the objection that an intervention on the Big Bang is conceptually ill-defined.
• The binary variable Big Bang ranges over the set of possible values {1, 2}.
These values represent two different ways in which the Big Bang might have taken place, as Maudlin's scenario suggests that the two possible moods of god (i.e. to be jealous and to be forgiving) lead to different initial conditions of the universe.
• The upshot of discussing Maudlin's divine intervention scenario is that merely logically possible interventions turn out to be eliminable without loss. As Maudlin points out, the decisive issue is counterfactual dependence which can be stated without reference to (merely logically possible) interventions.
Second Argument
The second argument against logically possible interventions relies on three alternative approaches to the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. Let me briefly motivate why determining the truth conditions of counterfactuals matters for our present concerns. Let us recall the motivation for employing interventions.
The main motivation for introducing interventions is closely tied to counterfactuals. Woodward's definitions of causation imply a specific kind of counterfactuals whose arguments are propositions that some variable takes a certain value in its range: "if there were an intervention I = i on X such that X = x, then Y = y would be the case" (cf. Woodward 2003: 15) . In the first argument, I
argued that logically possible interventions are dispensable for the truth conditions of causal statements. Now, in the second argument, I will change the perspective: for the sake of the argument, I will grant that merely logically possible interventions do play an indispensable role for the interventionist theory. There is a further and even more important reason to believe that an intervention on the Big Bang has to be clearly distinguished from a small miracle.
In the closest worlds at which the actual laws are preserved to a maximal degree, there is no small miracle (that is, no set of counterfactual initial conditions) such that a state of the world evolves in which the Big Bang occurs differently than it actually does. In other words, such an intervention is not even possible in the sense of physical possibility. As opposed to that, worlds in which merely logically (II) According to the meta-linguistic account (Goodman 1983 ), a counterfactual is true iff the consequent can be logically derived from a set of premises consisting of (1) laws of nature, and (2) the antecedent and other initial conditions. Using truly non-actual law statements as premises seems to be misguided, if one would like to evaluate a counterfactual at the actual world. According to the Goodmanian approach, it is the case that if a counterfactual is supposed to be true at the actual world, then the consequent has to be inferred from (maximally) actual laws (that do not include counterfactual invariant connections between a merely logically possible type of intervention and a type of cause) and singular statements.
(III) According to the suppositional theory (Ramsey 1929 : 247, Adams 1975 Chapter 4, Skyrms 1994 , Edgington 2008 The basic idea of the Ramsey-Test was historically first used to determine the assertability conditions of indicative conditionals by Adams (1975) . Adams analyzes the degree of assertability of an indicative conditional in terms of subjective probability: the degree of assertability of "if p, then will q" equals the subjective probability of q given p. Although this fact is often ignored, Adams (1975: Chapter 4) also argues that the suppositional theory can be applied to counterfactuals in a slightly modified way. In particular, Skyrms has developed the most sophisticated account of Adams's original idea. According to Skyrms (1994: 13-15) , one determines the pragmatic meaning of a counterfactual in terms of the degree of assertability: the degree of assertability of the counterfactual "if it were the case that p, then it would be that case that q" equals the subjectively expected objective conditional probability of q given p.
semantics that includes interventions. This is, of course, an unpleasant result for
interventionists.
Yet, let us take a step back. Maybe the situation is not so Although turning to interventionist semantics might be a tempting option for an advocate of an interventionist theory of causation, this strategy does not help to refute the second argument for three reasons. interventions by incorporating them into the interventionist semantics is an ad hoc move to defend the interventionist theory, and therefore it is not convincing.
Second, Woodward argues that his interventionist theory is a "practical" theory of causation -by contrast Lewis's counterfactual theory and Dowe's conserved quantity theory are "impractical" theories (cf. Woodward 2003: 28-38 ).
According to Woodward, a theory of causation is "practical" if it succeeds to "connect causal knowledge with some goal that has practical utility" (cf.
Woodward 2003: 30). Examples of a goal that has practical utility are successful manipulation (for instance, in medical, political, and scientific contexts) and reliable experimentation in the sciences. So, Woodward claims that if we come to believe that "X causes Y" and we understand the truth conditions of this claim in accord to the interventionist theory, then we can easily connect this causal knowledge to practical goals such as manipulation and experimentation. For instance, if we endorse an interventionist theory of causation, we know that we are in principle able to manipulate the effect Y by manipulating the cause X. We also know that if we want to design an experimental set-up which involves Y, then the belief that X causes Y is indeed relevant (for instance, because we might want to isolate Y from its cause X, or because we might want to exploit the causal relation between X and Y for manipulation within the experiment). However, even if one agrees with Woodward that theories of causation ought to be practical in the sense he suggests a problem arises for the interventionist: if one allows interventions to be merely logically possible, then the interventionist theory loses its practical character. For example, suppose that there it is merely logically possible to intervene on the Big Bang, and suppose that the statement "the Big Bang causes event e" is true. It is hard to see which practical goal can be achieved by this causal knowledge. For instance, if we had the goal to manipulate e then the interventionist theory does not explain how we can realize this goal because it is merely logically possible to change e by intervening on the Big Bang. I doubt that the knowledge that the occurrence of e counterfactually depends on the change of the Big Bang which is the outcome of a merely logically possible intervention satisfies Woodward's own requirement that a theory of causation ought to explain why we pursue certain practical goals. Quite the opposite is the case: accepting merely logically possible interventions undermines the appraised practical character of the interventionist theory of causation, because the link to practical goals (such as successful manipulation and reliable experimental practice in the sciences) is disrupted in cases involving interventions with this modal character.
Therefore, relying on an interventionist semantics which allows merely logically possible interventions is not convincing.
Third, if an interventionist attempts to refute the second argument by adopting an interventionist semantics, then merely logically possible interventions still remain subject to the dispensability argument. As argued above, merely logically possible interventions are dispensable. If interventions are dispensable then relying on an interventionist semantics obviously fails to reject the second argument.
Conclusion
Interventionists require that interventions be merely logically possible. I have argued against this requirement by establishing two claims: first, merely logically possible interventions are dispensable for stating the truth conditions of causal claims. If this is true, then the interventionist theory, as it stands, collapses.
Second, counterfactuals involving merely logically possible interventions lead to the fatal result that interventionist counterfactuals are inadequately false. This is likewise an unwelcome result for interventionists. I conclude that if we attempt to master the tasks of explicating causal concepts and stating the truth conditions of causal claims we best get rid of Woodwardian interventions.
